

Global Equity Research

China

UBS Investment Research China Market Strategy

Market Comment

7 May 2007

www.ubs.com/investmentresearch

Henry Ho

Strategist henry.ho@ubs.com +852-2971 7537

Louis Shan

Analyst louis.shan@ubs.com +852-2971 7513

Where China shares are going? #1--A-shares liquidity

Signs of bubble surfacing

There are many signs that A-shares are going into a bubble. However, history suggests that A-shares can stay overpriced for a sustainable period of time.

■ Liquidity to the stock market

We believe looking only at the monetary aggregates is insufficient. The 2005 stock market reform is a significant event. It changed perception on stock investment radically and brought investors' confidence back. We think a better indicator of liquidity going into equity market is the ratio of stock market turnover to money supply.

■ More liquidity into stocks

We have decomposed the turnover-to-M2 ratio by including market cap and GDP. We then compare this ratio to past bubble peaks in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and HK. We find further upside in China's turnover-to-M2 ratio before hitting a peak.

This report has been prepared by UBS Securities
Asia Ltd

The purpose of the three reports in this series is to examine the current rally in A-shares, and its effect on H-shares. In this first report, we argue that a bubble is in the making and that A-shares are heading towards higher levels of overpricing.

Signs of a bubble

There is no shortage of anecdotes on the A-shares 'stir frying'. Numerous newspaper articles have described interesting sources of retail participation, including money from students' tuition fees, cash under the pillows of retirees, and hard-earned wages from amah's and bar-workers. What about signs from the stock market? On 28 April, the A-shares of CITIC Bank made a debut with a 96% one-day gain over IPO price. In the next trading day, CITIC Bank shares went limit down as interests switched to the debuts of the A-share issues of Weichai Power and CHALCO (their prices went above IPO price by 217% and 180%, respectively). In these examples, we believe trading is dominated by participants that typically know very little of the fundamental value and earnings outlook of the companies.

Does reversion-to-mean work?

A look at the past pattern of A-shares shows wild deviation from mean PE, and stocks could stay over- or under- priced for sustainable periods (Chart 1). It also suggests **the major price driver of A-shares is not valuation**, contrary to what fundamental analysts are trained to believe. For example, we regard 2,200-2,900 as a reasonable range for the Shanghai A-Composite Index based on valuation parameters, but it last closed at 3,841 (*Market outlook: all the good news priced in*, Edmond Huang, January 19, 2007).

80.00 4000 70.00 3500 60.00 3000 50.00 2500 40.00 2000 30.00 1500 20.00 1000 500 10.00 Jan/96 Jan/01 Jan/06 Shanghai Composite Index (LS) —— Shanghai Composite Index P/E (RS)

Chart 1: Shanghai A-Composite index: frequent over-pricing

Source: CEIC, UBS

Available and willing?

Is China's often-quoted low market-cap-to-M2 going to drive the market higher? While this ratio for China appears low relative to most Asian markets, it is now at its all-time high (Chart 2). Admittedly in our report analyzing the 2005 share reform, we highlighted this low ratio as a *support* for the then jittery index at 1,000 (*A-shares: more potential upside than downside*, June 7, 2005). However,

for prices to go up, we think low money-to-market cap is a necessary but not sufficient condition. A rally requires the inclination to put money into the stock market. Why didn't the same retiree invest his money under-the-pillow in stocks in 2005? In April 2005, that ratio was much lower but the market kept going down. The relevant question is: what makes this retiree think that shares have suddenly become a place to put money in?

Chart 2: China A-shares market-cap-to-M2 at all-time high



Source: CEIC, UBS

Liquidity specific to stock trading

As we know, China's market is very liquidity-driven. The problem for forecasters is that most liquidity indicators are coincidental. They are useful to tell past trend, but most fail to offer predictive power or the ability to forecast turning points. And stock market liquidity is a loosely defined term. One useful measure is the ratio of money being circulated in stock market and money supply. The ratio of stock market turnover-to-M2 has been going up incessantly (Chart 3). It implies that people are willing to buy stocks from their money stock.

Chart 3: China A-shares turnover-to-M2 is rising rapidly



Source: CEIC, UBS

Dissecting liquidity for stock trading

This ratio can be expanded to:

Turnover / M2 = (Turnover / Market cap) X (Market cap / M2)

The two terms on the right-hand side can be interpreted as: (i) how quickly a stock is turned over in the market, and (ii) the size of the stock market relative to the money available. These ratios for China have all been rising sharply since 2006 (Charts 2-4).

Expanding the second term on the right-hand side gives:

Turnover /M2 = (Turnover / Market cap) X (Market cap / GDP) X (GDP / M2)

There are more familiar terms now. Market cap/GDP is a measure of how much of the economy is represented in listed stocks. GDP/M2 is a measure of how far the economy is monetized.

Chart 4: China A-shares – rising turnover to market cap




Source: CEIC, UBS


Decomposing liquidity

(i) We think GDP/M2 is becoming a stable ratio. The central bank is on full force dealing with the Rmb-induced inflows and excess liquidity (Chart 5). (ii) It is safe to assume market cap/GDP is rising, due to the upcoming stream of IPO and asset injections (Chart 6). Would more listing lead to falling valuation, keeping overall market cap flat or even falling? This was the fear over state share divestment pre-2005 share reform, as the pool of money available for stocks was assumed stagnant. Potential new supply would therefore depress prices. The actual outcome is: the success of the 2005 reform brought more money into stocks, more than enough to absorb new supply. The perceived better goal congruence between majority/minority shareholders and managers (see our 2005 A-share full listing series) has returned confidence to stock investing (Chart 7). (iii) With the product of Turnover/Market cap and Market cap/GDP rising while GDP/M2 stays stable, volume-to-M2 ratio is likely to keep going up.

Chart 5: China GDP to M2 - stabilizing

Chart 6: China mkt. cap. to GDP - keep rising





Source: CEIC, UBS

Source: CEIC, UBS

Chart 7: 2005 share reform – brought back investors' confidence




Source: CEIC, UBS

What happens in a bubble?


Let us draw from the experience during the following bubbles: Japan in 1989, Korea in 1989, Taiwan in 1990 and HK in 1997. Their turnover-to-M2 gives two key observations: (1) Three out of the four bubbles, turnover-to-M2 ratios peaked before the market index. Only in the 1997 HK bubble, this ratio peaked shortly after the index. (2) **The turnover-to-M2 ratio peaked at different levels: 9% for Japan, 60% for Taiwan, 12% for Korea, and 22% for HK.** (3) **The latest reading for China is just below 6%** and the trend is rising. Note that Korea (12%) and Taiwan (60%), in those years, have more similarity with China today. The reasons are the closeness of their capital markets and the high retail participation. It suggests 6% for China is not high (Charts 8-11).

Chart 8: Japan-turnover/M2 and index trend




Source: CEIC, Datastream, UBS

Chart 10: Taiwan-turnover/M2 and index trend




Source: CEIC, Datastream, UBS

Chart 9: Korea—turnover/M2 and index trend



Source: CEIC, Datastream, UBS

Chart 11: HK-turnover/M2 and index trend



Source: CEIC, Datastream, UBS

Too many new stock accounts?

Interestingly, many commentators quote the sharp rise in new stock trading accounts as sign of a peak. China is growing in all areas, and a single series is hard to interpret. Let us make a comparison between the number of mobile subscribers and the number of stock accounts at brokers. In China today, there are 480 million mobile phone subscribers, while there are 82 million individual A-share stock trading accounts. This can be looked at as a kind of 'stock affordability', and the number means there is one stock trading account for every six mobile phone subscribers. Back in the 2001 peak, this ratio stayed around 0.6-2.2, and hit 0.6 at its low, suggesting more stock accounts to come. Without getting bogged down into justifying their comparison, this exercise suggests we should not take popular arguments at face value.

Conclusion: further liquidity shift in a bubble

We believe looking at money aggregates alone misses the true picture of the liquidity flowing to China stocks. While it is true that the start of Rmb appreciation in July 2005 provided the fuel, the fire in stocks was ignited in early 2006 by the shift from money on deposits to stocks. This is because confidence on stock investing returned after the success of the non-tradable share reform. Our analysis suggests there could be more shift in the direction of stocks based on our decomposition of market turnover-to-M2. Once a change in human belief is formed, it takes a lot of persuasion to reverse it. Experience from other Asian markets suggests China could see more liquidity shift to stocks before A-shares hit the extremes we saw in past peaks in Korea and Taiwan.

What can go wrong?

(1) A higher-than-expected interest rate rise in China of over 100 basis points over the next six months; (2) A warning statement by a public opinion leader and a set of coordinated market cooling measures; (3) A contraction in global liquidity for equities, or hike in perceived risk; (4) A sudden significant price fall in A-shares, in the magnitude of over 15% in a week.

■ Statement of Risk

In our view, risks include a hard landing, a sharp rise in the US dollar, weak corporate governance amidst a tightening scenario, worse-than-expected global growth, cross-straits tension, a property market correction, and a fragile domestic broking industry.

■ Analyst Certification

Each research analyst primarily responsible for the content of this research report, in whole or in part, certifies that with respect to each security or issuer that the analyst covered in this report: (1) all of the views expressed accurately reflect his or her personal views about those securities or issuers; and (2) no part of his or her compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by that research analyst in the research report.

Required Disclosures

This report has been prepared by UBS Securities Asia Ltd, an affiliate of UBS AG (UBS).

For information on the ways in which UBS manages conflicts and maintains independence of its research product; historical performance information; and certain additional disclosures concerning UBS research recommendations, please visit www.ubs.com/disclosures.

UBS Investment Research: Global Equity Ratings Definitions and Allocations

UBS rating	Definition	UBS rating	Definition	Rating category	Coverage ¹	IB services ²
Buy 1	FSR is > 6% above the MRA, higher degree of predictability	Buy 2	FSR is > 6% above the MRA, lower degree of predictability	Buy	47%	37%
Neutral 1	FSR is between -6% and 6% of the MRA, higher degree of predictability	Neutral 2	FSR is between -6% and 6% of the MRA, lower degree of predictability	Hold/Neutral	42%	36%
Reduce 1	FSR is > 6% below the MRA, higher degree of predictability	Reduce 2	FSR is > 6% below the MRA, lower degree of predictability	Sell	12%	28%

^{1:} Percentage of companies under coverage globally within this rating category.

Source: UBS. Ratings allocations are as of 31 March 2007.

KEY DEFINITIONS

Forecast Stock Return (FSR) is defined as expected percentage price appreciation plus gross dividend yield over the next 12 months.

Market Return Assumption (MRA) is defined as the one-year local market interest rate plus 5% (a proxy for, and not a forecast of, the equity risk premium).

Predictability Level The predictability level indicates an analyst's conviction in the FSR. A predictability level of '1' means that the analyst's estimate of FSR is in the middle of a narrower, or smaller, range of possibilities. A predictability level of '2' means that the analyst's estimate of FSR is in the middle of a broader, or larger, range of possibilities.

Under Review (UR) Stocks may be flagged as UR by the analyst, indicating that the stock's price target and/or rating are subject to possible change in the near term, usually in response to an event that may affect the investment case or valuation.

EXCEPTIONS AND SPECIAL CASES

US Closed-End Fund ratings and definitions are: Buy: Higher stability of principal and higher stability of dividends; Neutral: Potential loss of principal, stability of dividend; Reduce: High potential for loss of principal and dividend risk.

UK and European Investment Fund ratings and definitions are: Buy: Positive on factors such as structure, management, performance record, discount; Neutral: Neutral on factors such as structure, management, performance record, discount; Reduce: Negative on factors such as structure, management, performance record, discount.

Core Banding Exceptions (CBE): Exceptions to the standard +/-6% bands may be granted by the Investment Review Committee (IRC). Factors considered by the IRC include the stock's volatility and the credit spread of the respective company's debt. As a result, stocks deemed to be very high or low risk may be subject to higher or lower bands as they relate to the rating. When such exceptions apply, they will be identified in the Companies Mentioned or Company Disclosure table in the relevant research piece.

Unless otherwise indicated, please refer to the Valuation and Risk sections within the body of this report.

^{2:} Percentage of companies within this rating category for which investment banking (IB) services were provided within the past 12 months.

Global Disclaimer

This report has been prepared by UBS Securities Asia Ltd or an affiliate thereof ("UBS"). In certain countries UBS AG is referred to as UBS SA.

This report is for distribution only under such circumstances as may be permitted by applicable law. It has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient and does not constitute a representation that any investment strategy is suitable or appropriate to a recipient's individual circumstances or otherwise constitute a personal recommendation. It is published solely for informational purposes, it does not constitute an advertisement and is not to be construed as a solicitation or an offer to buy or sell any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction. No representation or warranty, either express or implied, is provided in relation to the accuracy, completeness or reliability of the information contained herein, except with respect to information concerning UBS AG, its subsidiaries and affiliates, nor is it intended to be a complete statement or summary of the securities of their own judgement. Any opinions expressed in this report are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by other business areas or groups of UBS as a result of using different assumptions expressed will initiate, update and cease coverage solely at the discretion of UBS Investment Bank Research Management. The analysis contained herein is based on numerous assumptions could result in materially different results. The analysis(is) report may interact with trading desk personnel, sales personnel and other constituencies for the purpose of gathering, synthesizing and interpreting market information. UBS is under no obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. UBS relies on information barriers to control the flow of information contained in one or more areas within UBS, into other areas, units, groups or affiliates of UBS. The compensation is not based on investment banking, Analyst compensation is not based on investment banking revenues, however, compensation is not based on investment ba

The securities described herein may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to certain categories of investors. Options, derivative products and futures are not suitable for all investors, and trading in these instruments is considered risky. Mortgage and asset-backed securities may involve a high degree of risk and may be highly volatile in response to fluctuations in interest rates and other market conditions. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. Foreign currency rates of exchange may adversely affect the value, price or income of any security or related instrument mentioned in this report. For investment advice, trade execution or other enquiries, clients should contact their local sales representative. Neither UBS nor any of its affiliates, or any of its affiliates, directors, employees or agents accepts any liability for any loss or damage arising out of the use of all or any part of this report. Additional information will be made available upon request.

For financial instruments admitted to trading on an EU regulated market: UBS AG, its affiliates or subsidiaries (excluding UBS Securities LLC and/or UBS Capital Markets LP) acts as a market maker or liquidity provider (in accordance with the interpretation of these terms in the UK) in the financial instruments of the issuer save that where the activity of liquidity provider is carried out in accordance with the definition given to it by the laws and regulations of any other EU jurisdictions, such information is separately disclosed in this research report.

United Kingdom and the rest of Europe: Except as otherwise specified herein, this material is communicated by UBS Limited, a subsidiary of UBS AG, to persons who are market counterparties or intermediate customers (as detailed in the FSA Rules) and is only available to such persons. The information contained herein does not apply to, and should not be relied upon by, private customers. UBS Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. France: Prepared by UBS Limited and distributed by UBS Limited and UBS Securities France SA. UBS Securities France SA. Los Carmany: Prepared by UBS Limited and distributed by UBS Limited and UBS Deutschland AG. UBS Deutschland AG is regulated by the Bundesanstalt fur Finanzidenstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin). Spain: Prepared by UBS Limited and distributed by UBS Limited and UBS Securities España SV, SA is regulated by the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). Turkey: Prepared by UBS Menkul Degerler AS on behalf of and distributed by UBS Limited. Russia: Prepared and distributed by the Moscow Representative Office of UBS Cyprus Moscow Limited. Switzerland: Distributed by UBS AG to persons who are institutional investors only. Italy: Prepared by UBS Limited and UBS Italia Sim S.p.A.. uBS Italia Sim S.p.A.. uBS Italia Sim S.p.A.. is regulated by the Bank of Italy and by the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB). Where an analyst of UBS Italia Sim S.p.A. has contributed to this report to report is also deemed to have been prepared by UBS Italia Sim S.p.A. south Africa: UBS South Africa (Pty) Limited (Registration No. 1995/011140/07) is a member of the JSE Limited, the South African Futures Exchange and the Bond Exchange of South Africa. UBS South Africa and UBS Securities LLC or by UBS Financial Services Inc., subsidiaries of UBS AG in you paging a paging and the south of the principal Canadian stock exchanges & CIPF. A statement of its financial Services Inc. A

The disclosures contained in research reports produced by UBS Ltd shall be governed by and construed in accordance with English law

© 2007 UBS. All rights reserved. This report may not be reproduced or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the written permission of UBS and UBS accepts no liability whatsoever for the actions of third parties in this respect.

